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9

Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul

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According to an old and venerable view in the history of western philosophy, the human soul is a single, simple, indivisible entity. The view goes back as far as Plato, in particular his *Phaedo*. Furthermore, there is an old and venerable argument for this kind of view that finds its best-known expression in the Second Paralogism in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. He stated the argument as follows:

> That the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is *simple*.
> Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being. Therefore, etc.[1]

The argument proposes that the subject of thought must be simple because thinking is the kind of activity that can't be regarded as the 'concurrence of several things acting,' as would have to be the case for the action of a composite. Kant explained the support for this claim about the nature of thought as follows:

> For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of it would contain [*enthalten*] a part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot consistently be maintained. For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is therefore possible only in a *single* substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple.[2]

He labeled the argument 'The Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure doctrine of the soul.' Following Kant it is often called 'the Achilles Argument.' The argument turns on what now are labeled issues around the 'unity of consciousness,' and it was widely used during the early modern period.

[1] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St Martin's Press, 1965), A351. Kant discussed the argument in order to criticize it.
[2] Ibid. A352. Kemp Smith translates *enthalten* as 'be.'

The roots of this argument can be traced back as far as Plato, whose *Phaedo* contains an argument for the immortality of the soul from its indivisibility. A version of the argument itself can be found as early as Plotinus.[3] My interest lies in its early modern manifestations, which varied in the details. Kant stated that the conclusion of the argument is the simplicity of the soul; others referred to its indivisibility or its unity. Furthermore, the argument was sometimes offered in terms of consciousness, as in the case of Samuel Clarke. But other terms for mental phenomena were used and a range of mental phenomena was cited to support the argument. Bayle, for example, used a version of the argument that focused on the nature of sense perception. Leibniz's view was that the subject of *perception* must be simple, and he did not think that all perceptions are conscious.[4]

While the details varied, the central idea of the argument was constant. As Kant explained, crucial to the argument is the idea that an entity that consists of parts cannot be the subject of a mental state. Otherwise each part of the subject would contain a part of the mental state and there would be no subject that has the entire mental state. Its conclusion was then often used to defend the soul's immortality on the ground that something that is simple or indivisible cannot go out of existence because ceasing to be (or rather, ceasing to be through natural processes) happens only through decomposition.[5] It was also used to defend the soul's immateriality on the ground that matter is inherently composite and divisible. Most important for the purposes of the present chapter, however, is its contention that the unification of a set of contents in a mind requires that the mind be an entity that is simple or indivisible, that is lacking in parts, or unified in a particular sense.

Suárez's conception of the human soul was very different from the one involved in the early modern Achilles Argument. For the early modern users of this argument the soul was an exclusively spiritual substance: they were either dualists or, in the case of

[3] Plato does not offer the argument himself. His argument in the *Phaedo* does not appeal to the unification of mental contents as the Achilles Argument does. Discussion of that issue in Plato can be found at *Thaeatetus* 184–7. To my knowledge, Plato never combines the two. For the history of this argument see Ben Lazare Mijuscovic, *The Achilles of Rational Arguments* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), and for more detailed discussion of its occurrence in various philosophers, see *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology*, eds. Tom Lennon and Robert Stainton (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008). This volume contains papers about each of the philosophers I mention in this chapter except for Suárez.

[4] While Leibniz did not offer the full Achilles Argument, its central ideas appear in his writings. He defines perception as 'the passing state which involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance' (*Monadology* 14). For Samuel Clarke, see his correspondence with Anthony Collins in Samuel Clarke, *The Works* (London, 1738, reprint, Garland Publishing, New York, 1978), vol. III. For his statement of the Achilles argument, see p. 730. For discussion of the notion of consciousness, see *Works* 3: 784. Bayle spoke of the unity of the thinking subject or substance. He used the argument against the view that the subject of sensation and knowledge (*sensation et connaissance*) is a collection of atoms. He relies on analyses of the sensation of pain and the sense perception of an entire tree. See his article 'Leucippus,' *Dictionnaire critique et philosophique*, 5th ed. (Amsterdam, 1740) 3: 101–2. For a translation of Bayle, see *Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections*, trans. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 130.

[5] Early modern philosophers commonly allowed that even if the soul is naturally immortal, God could always end its existence.

Leibniz, idealists. But for Suárez the soul was both a spiritual substance and a substantial form: it could exist without the body, but it was at the same time the form of the body.[6] More directly relevant is the fact that for Suárez the faculties of the soul, which he saw as accidents that emanate from it, were really distinct from it. Indeed, for Suárez the soul with its faculties is one by aggregation—'*anima cum potentiis est unum per aggregationem*.'[7] This is a difference between our soul and God. Unlike God, who acts through his essence, we need faculties that Suárez regarded as really distinct from our soul to exercise all the capacities we have.[8] This was a widespread view. So Suárez's conception of the soul seems quite different from the one proposed by the Achilles Argument.

This complexity in the soul is not peculiar to Suárez. Within the Scholastic tradition it was common to think that the powers of the soul are really distinct from it or that there is a complexity in the soul in the sense that a living being contains more than one soul. But it is this very complexity in Suárez's soul that gives rise to a line of thought that has genuine affinity with the reasoning of the Achilles Argument. For Suárez observed that there were important connections between the activities of the faculties of the soul. He saw this as a problem because he held that the faculties of the soul themselves do not interact with each other. His solution to the problem was to give the soul itself, as distinct from its powers, a direct role in all the activities of its powers. Furthermore he appealed to the need for such an explanation in defending the claim that in the human being (as well as other natural substances) there is over and above the faculties a substantial form that is their principle. The affinity between Suárez's thinking and the Achilles Argument comes out most clearly, however, when he argued against the widespread view that there is more than one soul or substantial form in a substance, for instance that there is a sensitive and an intellectual soul in a human being. Focusing on the human case he argued that there must be only a single substantial form or soul in a human being—as well as in other substances—if we are to explain the connectedness of the activities of the faculties of the substance. Consequently he used the relevant line of thought to argue for a specific lack of composition; a living substance in particular does not contain a multiplicity of forms or souls, each of which is responsible for a certain type of activity (e.g. sensitive soul for sense perception, intellectual soul for intellectual activity, etc.). A single soul in living substances underlies all the activities souls are meant to explain.

[6] See, for instance, DM disp. 15, § 1, no. 6, 1: 499. I use the following translations of Disputations 15 and 18: *On the Formal Cause of Substance: Metaphysical Disputation XV*, trans. John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000) and *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*, trans. Alfred Freddoso (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

[7] CDA★ 2.3. no.10. He makes this claim while arguing that God's act of creating the soul does not *eo ipso* result in the creation of its powers, because these are really distinct from the soul and emanate from it (*dimanare, emanare*).

[8] CDA★, 2.1. nos. 4–5.

While I will argue that this line of thought in Suárez bears significant similarity to the Achilles Argument, I will also discuss several important differences. One of these concerns the types of activities and powers Suárez analyzed in his argument. I have noted that while it is tempting to think of the Achilles Argument as an argument from the 'the unity of consciousness,' in the early modern period, it was not always the notion of consciousness that was central to the Achilles Argument. In that context it is more proper to speak of the unity of the mental. Suárez did not, of course, use the notion of consciousness introduced by Descartes which is nowadays so central to the philosophy of mind.[9] What is more, for Suárez the relevant category is not the mental but life. He saw the soul as the principle of life and he applied his line of argument to *vital* faculties, powers that produce the manifestations of *life*, which include intellectual activity, will, sense perception, appetite, locomotion, nutrition, and growth.

The chapter is laid out as follows. In Section I, I will explain two important instances of Suárez's discussion of connections between faculties from his *De Anima*.[10] Suárez proposed to explain these connections in terms of their 'rootedness' in the same soul. In Section II, I turn to the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (DM) where Suárez went beyond this explanation and used these connections to argue that the soul must contribute efficient causality directly to the activities of its powers. In Section III, I will explain the main sense in which Suárez's use of this line of thinking resembled the early modern Achilles Argument. In Section IV, I will discuss various similarities and differences.

I: The soul as the root of its faculties

While Suárez held that the faculties of the soul are really distinct from each other, they contribute to each other's activity: the internal senses require the activity of the external senses and the intellect requires the activity of the imagination. The question of how the imagination with its images and phantasms contributed to the production of intelligible species was an important problem in Scholastic analyses of human understanding. The problem is this: how can I arrive at an understanding of what it is to be a cow from my experiences of particular cows? As was standard, Suárez thought that when a human being understands, the agent intellect forms an intelligible species in response to a phantasm, that is a representation in the imagination, which ultimately derives from sense experience. The role of the phantasm, Suárez explained, lay in the fact that it was needed to determine the agent intellect to produce one particular intelligible species rather than another: a phantasm of a cow leads to the production of

[9] I am not assuming that Descartes' notion is the same as the one used in contemporary philosophy of mind.

[10] There are two extant versions of Suárez's *De anima*, which were never published during his lifetime. At the time of his death he was in the process of revising his *De anima* and the revisions were completed by Alvarez for the 1621 edition, which is the one published in OO. I used this version (CDA⋆), which was the one that was available in the early modern period, but it is not entirely the work of Suárez's hand. An earlier version that was entirely Suárez's work is available in the following edition: CDA.

an intelligible species of bovinity in the intellect. The central question is how it can do so. As Suárez explained the problem, it arises because the phantasm is material and the intellect and the intelligible species are spiritual.[11] Furthermore the material is inferior to the immaterial or spiritual, and the lower cannot act on the higher as an efficient cause. So how can the phantasm contribute to the production of an intelligible species, if it can't simply produce it by efficient causation?

Some Scholastics held that the phantasm is a partial cause of the intelligible species. But Suárez argued that the phantasm is not a cause of the intelligible species *at all*. In the explanation of his own view Suárez used language that we find later in Descartes and others, writing that the phantasm is required 'either as the *occasion that excites* [the intellect], or that exemplifies, or that is at most elevated as instrument through the spiritual light of the same soul.'[12] Descartes also often called the physical cause of sensation an occasion. Suárez quoted with approval Aquinas' claim that the phantasm is 'in some manner the matter of the cause.' What did this mean for him?

Suárez made clear that it did not mean that the phantasm functions as the material cause, and he specified that the Thomists did not think this either, for it would require that the intelligible species be educed from a phantasm, which was not possible since a spiritual species can't be educed from something that is material.[13] Suárez also wrote that the phantasm 'provides as it were [*veluti*] the matter for the agent intellect for producing the intelligible species' (ibid.) and that it 'functions like [*habente se instar*] the matter or what excites the soul or like an exemplar.'[14] Unfortunately, these remarks are not very clear and full of qualifications (e.g., *veluti*, *habente se instar*, etc.).

What does become clear is that central to his account is the idea that imagination and intellect are faculties of one and the same soul:

> The aforesaid determination [of the intellect by the phantasm to produce a particular species] does not come about by way of any influx of the phantasm itself but by its providing matter and as it were an exemplar to the agent intellect in virtue of the union that they both have in the same soul. . . . For it must be noted that the phantasm and the intellect of a human being are rooted in one and the same soul. Whence it happens that they have a remarkable ordering and harmony [*mirum ordinem et consonantiam*] in their operation, so that (as will become clear below) in virtue of the very fact that the intellect operates, the imagination also senses. . . . And so it happens that the soul when first it knows something through the imagination it depicts, as it were, the same thing

[11] CDA⋆, 4.2. no. 1. For discussion of the significance of this problem in medieval theories of the mental, see Peter King, 'Scholasticism and the Philosophy of Mind: The Failure of Aristotelian Psychology', in *Scientific Failure*, ed. Tamara Horowitz (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 109–38.

[12] 'Vel ut occasio excitans, vel ut exemplat, vel ad summum, ut instrumentum elevatum per spiritualem lumen eiusdem animae' (CDA⋆, 1.11. no. 21, emphasis added). The term *occasio*, which Suárez employed here, was much used by the Scholastics. For extensive discussion, see Rainer Specht, *Commercium mentis et corporis* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1966).

[13] CDA⋆, 4.2. no. 10.

[14] 'Praebet veluti materiam intellectui agenti ad efficiendam speciem intelligibilem' and 'sed habente se instar materiae, aut excitantis animam, aut vero ad instar exemplaris' (CDA⋆, 4.2. no. 12).

in the possible intellect. It does so by way of a transient action, which consequently is not a cognition.[15]

So Suárez explained the role of the imagination in terms of the fact that imagination and intellect are faculties of the same soul. This explains, he thought, that they operate in harmony and in turn that the imagination can contribute to the functioning of the intellect.[16]

Now clearly the connection between mental contents of the imagination and intellect posed a specific problem in Scholastics such as Suárez because they held that the phantasm is material and the intelligible species and the intellect are not. But Suárez explicitly related this problem to other examples of the connections between mental contents or acts, problems that do not spring from the hierarchy of the mental and the physical. And for those problems he offered this same solution in terms of the faculties of the soul being rooted in the same soul. In particular he used the same model for the relationship between the activity of the external and internal senses, as well as the dependence of appetitive on cognitive acts.[17] I will examine the first of these cases in some detail.

Unlike others in the Aristotelian tradition, Suárez combined the internal senses into one single power that exercises various types of activities traditionally classified as internal sensation, including imagination and memory. So, at stake is the connection between sensing something and remembering or imagining it.[18] Similarly, Suárez argued here that we cannot understand the contribution of the external senses to internal sensation in terms of the external sensory powers contributing efficient causality to internal sensation. For Suárez the external and internal senses are equally material; both types of powers operate in the body and neither has just the soul for its subject, as is the case for intellect and will. Rather their subject is matter informed by the soul.[19] So, given that both powers are material powers, what prevents the external senses from acting on the internal senses by way of efficient causality? Examination of

[15] 'Praedicta determinatio non fit per influxum aliquem ipsius phantasmatis, sed materiam, et quasi exemplar intellectui agenti praebendo, ex fi unionis, quam habent in eadem anima. . . . est enim notandum, phantasma et intellectum hominis radicari in una eademque anima: hinc enim provenit, ut mirum habeant ordinem et consonantiam in operando unde (quod patebit infra eo ipso) quod intellectus operatur, imaginatio etiam sentit. . . . atque ita fit, ut anima cum primum phantasiando cognoscit rem aliquam, per virtutem spiritualem, quam intellectum agentem vocamus, quasi depingat rem eamdem in intellectu possibili, atque adeo per actionem transeuntem, quae proinde cognitio non est' (CDA⋆, 4.2. no. 12).

[16] For a version of this idea see also the Coimbra Commentators, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis in tres libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae* (Lyon, 1604), III.8.8.2, 454, and Eustachius of St. Paul, *Summa philosophica quadripartita* (Paris: Carolus Chastellain, 1609), III: 440, who spoke of a *natural connection* between intellect and imagination while the soul is in the body. For a very interesting discussion of Suárez's use of this notion, see Walter Hoeres, 'Bewußtsein und Erkenntnisbild bei Suarez,' *Scholastik* 36 (1961): 192–216. For extensive discussion, see also Josef Ludwig, *Das Akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnisleere des Suarez* (München: Karl Ludwig, 1929).

[17] See CDA⋆, 3.9. no. 10 and CDA⋆, 5.3. In his discussion of the relationship between intellect and imagination Suárez listed both these cases as examples where the same model applies (CDA⋆, 4.2. no. 12).

[18] For very illuminating discussion of the internal senses in Suárez, see James South, 'Francisco Suárez on Imagination,' *Vivarium* 39 (2001): 119–58.

[19] CDA⋆, 2.3. no. 3.

this example illuminates Suárez's conception of the soul. Part of the problem is that for Suárez the powers of the soul are really distinct from each other and from the soul itself.[20] But the real distinction between the faculties by itself is not the source of the problem; after all other types of really distinct things do interact. The problem arises from their natures as powers of the soul.

For Suárez external sensation involves both a species and an act in the external sensory power, and similarly for internal sensation. So either the external species or the act of external sensation might be thought to cause the internal species and internal sensation. An obvious candidate for an explanation is that the external species causes the internal species: we could think in terms of transmission of species as many others had done. But Suárez ruled this out. He offered various arguments against it.[21] One was that if the internal species is superior to the external species it cannot be caused by it,[22] so again hierarchical considerations play a role. But this was not the only consideration, and particularly interesting for our purposes is his view that the occurrence of a species in the external senses did not always result in activity of the internal senses. We need, in addition, the act of sensation, which he argued does not always occur when a species is received in the external sense. He cited empirical examples: when our sensory powers receive species we do not always have the expected sensation, as in the case of absentmindedness (*deliquium animae)* or ecstasy. So the sensory organ may receive a species without anyone actually seeing. In such a case the internal sense is not active.[23]

So then the question is whether perhaps the external act of sensation causes the internal species. But Suárez thought not, because 'a cognition is not productive of another quality distinct from itself.'[24] He held that in general the cause of an act of cognition is the 'power informed by the species.'[25] He concluded that the 'internal species result in the internal sense from its own efficient causality.'[26]

Two related ideas seem to be in the background. First there is the well-established view that cognition is an immanent act, and that 'it is impossible for an immanent act to

[20] CDA⋆, 2.1. This question is devoted to arguing that the powers of the soul are distinct *ex natura rei* and really distinct from the essence of the soul. Suárez argued against the latter claim by rejecting Scotus' view that they are formally distinct from the soul. One argument for this conclusion is that they are distinct from each other; this would not be possible if they were not distinct from the soul. If they are identical to the soul, they would be identical to each other (CDA⋆, 2.1. no. 4).

[21] For more discussion, see South, 'Suárez on Imagination.'

[22] CDA⋆, 3.9. no. 6.

[23] Ibid. In this context Suárez discusses the role of 'vital attention.' For helpful discussion of this notion, see Cees Leijenhorst, 'Attention Please! Theories of Selective Attention in Late Aristotelian and Early Modern Philosophy,' in *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. J. J. M. Bakker and Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007); and idem, 'Cajetan and Suárez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought,' in *Forming the Mind. Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007); and South, 'Suárez on Imagination.'

[24] 'Cognitio non sit productiva alterius qualitatis a se distinctae realiter' (CDA⋆, 3.9. no. 10).

[25] 'Principium integrum productivum actus est potentia informata specie' (CDA⋆, 3.4. no. 13).

[26] 'Species interiores resultare in interiori sensu ex propria illius efficientia' (CDA⋆, 3.9. no. 10).

be received in one power, and be produced by *(fieri ab)* another.'[27] Second, Suárez appealed to the nature of the vital powers of the soul, that is the powers that manifest life: these are not limited to what we now regard as mental activity. Suárez argued that each vital power must produce or be the efficient cause of its own acts, for 'a thing is said to be living which has an intrinsic principle of action.'[28] He wrote: 'the act of a vital power does not effect the act of another one.'[29] This appears to be an appeal to the traditional conception of life as involving an internal principle of action. Remarkably Suárez interpreted this idea as ruling out the possibility that one faculty of the soul can produce the activity of another faculty of the same soul.

So for Suárez nothing about external sensation, neither its species nor its act, contributes efficient causality to internal sensation. Instead, as in the case of the production of the intelligible species in response to the activity of the imagination, he appealed to the fact that both external and internal senses are faculties of the same soul:

> It is probable that the interior species result in the interior sense from a proper efficient causality (*efficientia)* of that sense. We will prove this conclusion below in Bk 4. ch. 2 when we deal with intelligible species. Now however I declare it results from the above mentioned sympathy, or agreement of the knowing powers on account of their rootedness in the same soul [*sympathia, seu consensione potentiarum cognoscentium propter radicationem in animam eadem*]. For from the fact that the soul knows through an external sense, in the presence of [*ad*] such a cognition without any activity from it [*absque ulla eius activitate*] an internal species results effectively from the internal sense.[30]

Again, this happens 'because of the coordination and union which these powers have in the same soul.'[31] So the species and act of the external sense do not produce the internal species, the internal sense itself does it. But it does so in response to activity in the external sense, that is in response to its act of cognition. And it can do so in virtue of the fact that both faculties are rooted in the same soul. This explains, Suárez suggested, why when one operates the other one also does. But how exactly does this 'rootedness in the same soul' explain this coordination between the faculties?

II: The soul's efficient causality

Suárez addressed this question directly in the *Disputationes metaphysicae*. In DM 18.5 he argued that substantial forms contribute efficient causality directly to the activity of their accidental powers. He criticized the common opinion, according to which:

[27] 'impossibile est actionem immanentem recipi in una potentia, et fieri ab altera' (CDA★, 3.4. no. 2).

[28] 'Vivere res dicitur, quae intra se habet principium actionis' (CDA★, 3.4. no. 2).

[29] 'Actus potentiae vitalis actum alterius non efficit' (CDA★, 5.3. no. 6).

[30] 'Probabile est species interiores resultare in interiori sensu ex propria illius efficientia. Hanc conclusionem probabimus, infra l.4, c. 2, agentes de Speciebus intelligibilibus. Nunc vero declaratur ex supra dicta sympathia seu consensione potentiarum cognoscentium propter radicationem in anima eadem. Nam eo ipso, quod anima per externum sensum cognoscit, ad praesentiam talis cognitionis absque ulla ejus activitate resultat ab interno sensu effective interna species' (CDA★, 3.9. no. 10).

[31] 'Propter coordinationem et unionem, quam istae potentiae habent in eadem anima' (CDA★, 3.9. no. 7).

the accidental form is the proximate principle but the substantial form is the principal principle of all the suppositum's actions, even of its accidental actions. However, the doctors do not explain what this notion [*ratio*] of a principal principle consists in or what the influence of a principal principle is—or, if they do say something in passing, they suggest that this influence consist solely in the fact that the [substantial] form is the root and principle [*radix et principium*] of the accidental power that is given to it by nature in order to serve as its proximate principle for eliciting an action. However, the substantial form is not thought to have a proximate and actual influence in the very exercise of an accidental action.[32]

Suárez rejected this view on several grounds. His first argument concerns vital actions; for them 'it is not only the accidental power but also the soul itself, through its own substance, that has within its own order a proximate influence on these actions.'[33] So the soul itself exercises efficient causality directly in such actions and its role is not limited to being the principle of the faculties.[34] He supported this point with an argument from experience: he appealed to the idea that the presence of a species is not sufficient for sight, as is illustrated by cases of apoplexy or ecstasy. Suárez thought that the problem was that sight will not occur if 'the soul is not attentive.'[35] So he relied on the idea that the act of attention is an operation that directly involves the soul itself, and it means for him that the soul is involved directly as an efficient cause.

Furthermore he contended that his view that the soul plays a direct efficiently causal role is confirmed by:

that other sort of experience through which we proved above that there is only one soul in a human being. For it is indisputable that excessive attention to the work of one faculty impedes [the soul] in the work of another.[36] For example, if a man is looking at something very intently, he will not hear someone who is speaking to him. And lest this be attributed to a defect in the [animal] spirits, it is also the case that the intellect's attentiveness impedes the operation of the senses, and that the more profound and perfect that attentiveness is, the more it diminishes the imagination's motion or representation as well—and (what is more) it even impedes or suspends the works of the nutritive part of the soul.[37] But if each faculty had its own operation

[32] 'accidentalem formam esse principium proximum; substantialem vero esse principale principium omnium actionum suppositi, etiam accidentalium. In quo autem consistat hae ratio principalis principii, vel quis sit influxus ejus, aut Doctores id non declarant, vel, si aliquid obiter dicunt, insinuant in hoc solum consistere, quod forma est radix et principium facultatis accidentalis, quae illi data est a natura, ut ei sit proximum principium ad eliciedam actionem. In ipso autem exercitio actionis accidentalis non creditur substantialis forma habere influxum proximum et actualem' (DM, disp. 18, § 5, no. 1, 1: 627–8).

[33] 'ipsam animam per suam substantiam, in illas proxime in suo ordine influere' (DM, disp. 18, § 5, no. 2, 1: 628).

[34] I am not sure what the phrase '*per suam substantiam*' means. It seems likely that this is Suárez's version of Aquinas' distinction between the soul's essence and its faculties (see ST, 1a.77.a.1). However, it is clear that it was meant to distinguish the soul from its faculties.

[35] 'Si anima non attendat' (DM, disp. 18, § 5, no. 2, 1: 628).

[36] Freddoso's translation omits 'the soul,' but the grammar of the sentence in Latin requires it.

[37] Suárez also offered the following reply to the objection that the failure of sense perception may be due to some fact about the animal spirits, a physiological explanation. The concurrence of the spirits is necessary, he grants, but they are subject to the directing influence of the soul: 'They have an influence on the act not by chance, but by virtue of some faculty that directs those spirits to that act. Therefore there must be some

through itself alone, then there would be no explanation for why the operation of one faculty should impede the operation of another.[38]

So the fact that the faculties of the soul interfere with each other's activity must be explained in terms of a direct causal role for the soul, 'through its substance.' If the faculties operated alone and without the soul's coordinating role, there would be no explanation for this interference.

What Suárez had in mind was this: if I am focusing on my thoughts about Suárez, I may be distracted from noticing a spider crawling on the wall, but that won't prevent *you* from noticing it. He thought the faculties are distinct from each other in a sufficiently strong sense that if they operate only by themselves, they lack the sort of connections that do occur between mental states in an individual (but not between the states of different individuals). And Suárez thought that the explanation is that a single soul is directly and simultaneously involved in both types of activities.

Besides interference between the faculties, Suárez argued, their cooperation, which we examined in the previous section, offers the best argument for the direct role of the soul:

> When the intellect understands, the will is excited to love etc. The reason for this is that the same soul actually operates through both faculties. For a sort of habitual rootedness, that is, remote emanation from the same soul—would not by itself be sufficient for this actual causality (that is motion and excitation) if each of the operations proceeded in actuality from its own faculty alone, without being connected in some common principle.[39]

In sum if each faculty operated entirely on its own, the fact that they cooperate or impede each other would be inexplicable. The direct causal role of the soul is required to explain their connections.

In an entirely different vein, Suárez also appealed to the idea that life involves an internal principle of action as an *a priori* argument[40] based on 'the proper mode of a vital operation, which requires this sort of intimate connection with its principal

common principle that actually uses the two faculties in question and which, because of a natural inclination or sympathy, orders the action of the first faculty towards the act of the second faculty' 'sed virtute alicuius facultatis ministrantis illos spiritus ad illum actum; ergo necesse est ut sit aliquod commune principium actu utens illis duabus facultatibus, et ex naturali inclinatione, vel sympathia ordinans actionem unius ad actum alterius' (DM, disp. 18, § 2, 1: 598–615; see also DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 15).

[38] 'Praeterea hoc confirmat alia experientia, qua supra probabamus esse in homine unam tantum animam, quia nimirum ex nimia attentione ad opus unius facultatis impeditur in opere alterius, ut si nimis attente aliquid homo inspiciat, non audiet loquentem; et ne id tribuatur defectui spirituum, etiam attentio intellectus impedit operationem sensus, et quo est altior et perfectior, eo plus minuit etiam phantansiae motum aut repraesentationem, et (quod magis est) etiam opera nutritivae partis impedit, vel suspendit. Si autem unaquaeque facultas sola per seipsam haberet suam operationem, nulla esset ratio cur unius operatio impediret operationem alterius' (DM, disp. 18, § 5, no. 3, 1: 628; see also DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 15, 1: 502–3).

[39] 'dum intellectus intelligit, voluntas excitatur ad amandum, etc.; hoc autem ideo est quia eadem anima per utramque potentiam actu operatur; nam sola veluti habitualis radicatio, seu remota dimanatio ab eadem anima, non esset satis ad hanc actualem causalitatem, seu motionem et excitationem, si unaquaeque operatio a sua sola potentia actualiter prodiret sine connexione in aliquo communi principio' (DM, disp. 18, § 5, no. 3, 1: 628).

[40] Of course, Suárez's distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* is not the same as Kant's.

formal principle. . . . For as far as we can ascertain from experience, this is what actual life consists in, and this is the primary difference between living and nonliving things.'[41]

So in this disputation Suárez took a significantly clearer stance on the nature of the role of the soul in explaining the connections of the activities of its faculties: It exercises direct efficient causality in the production of various vital acts through its substance. The soul's role is not limited to being the root and principle of its powers, and the vital activities are not just activities of its powers.[42]

This is not to say that the picture is now complete. For we might still ask: why exactly does the soul produce one vital action in response to another one? For instance, what is the process in the soul itself as opposed to its faculties that explains how it produces an act of imagination in response to an act of external sensation, or an act of intellection in response to an act of imagination? We know that it is not that the initial act produces the second one by efficient causation. This question thus brings us back to the language Suárez used in his discussion of the formation of an intelligible species in response to a phantasm in his *De anima*. What does it mean for the soul to be 'excited' by a phantasm to a further operation?[43] Or that it uses the phantasm as matter, or material, and as it were as an exemplar? Some of Suárez's language evokes the picture of the soul looking at an image, which was the word in Aristotle, and then forming an intelligible species in response. But how is this to be understood metaphysically? I do not see a clear answer to this question.

III: The unity in Suárez's soul and the Achilles Argument

At this point I think we can clearly see the relationship between Suárez's thinking and the Achilles Argument. Suárez's problem arose from views about the soul that separated him from the users of the Achilles Argument. His problem was that the vital faculties are really distinct from each other (as well as from the soul) and can't interact

[41] 'Ratio autem a priori sumi potest ex proprio modo operationis vitalis, quae requirit hanc intimam connexionem cum suo principali principio formali . . . quantum enim experientia assequi possumus, in hoc consistit actualis vita, et primaria differentia viventium a non viventibus' (DM, disp. 18, § 5, no. 3, 1: 628). A striking feature of Suárez's discussions is that he repeatedly claimed that the functioning of vital powers involves an *intimate* connection with the soul. For instance: 'For these vital actions come about in such an intimate way, that they seem actually to proceed from the first principle of life itself, which is the soul,' 'nam hae actiones vitales tam intimo modo fiunt, ut ab ipso primo principio vitae, quod est anima, actualiter procedere videantur' (DM, disp. 18, § 5, no. 2, 1: 628). I don't know what to make of this expression.

[42] An interesting question arises about the relationship of this account to what we saw in Suárez's *De anima*, where he relied on the rootedness of the faculties in the soul without, to my knowledge, offering a direct causal role for the soul. Suárez's account in his *De anima* could be the kind of account that he criticized as inadequate in DM, disp. 18, § 5. On the other hand, one could take the statements in DM as a supplement to what he says in the *De anima*. For discussion of the history of *De anima*, see South 'Suárez on Imagination' and the introduction to CDA. For discussion of the role of substantial forms as efficient causes in Suárez and other medievals, see Robert Pasnau, 'Form, Substance, and Mechanism,' *The Philosophical Review* 113 (2004): 31–88, and Kara Richardson, *The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy*, unpublished PhD Diss., University of Toronto, 2008), ch. 4.

[43] CDA★, 4.2. no. 12; see also DM disp. 18, § 5, no. 3.

causally. Indeed as we saw, Suárez wrote that the soul plus its faculties is one by aggregation.[44] But it is essential that the soul *plus its faculties has this status*: Suárez distinguished the soul itself from its really distinct faculties. And it is important to him that the soul qua substantial form is a single, unitary entity that is the root of the faculties.[45]

The affinity with the Achilles Argument comes out more clearly when Suárez appeals to the soul's role in explaining the connection between the faculties during his argument for the need for a single substantial form in a natural substance. First the interference among faculties is an argument for substances having substantial forms: 'We experience that, if a thing which has many faculties of operation acts intensely through one faculty, it is impeded so that it cannot act through another faculty, or so that it cannot act through another with such great force.'[46] If there were merely a collection of powers that acted independently and no underlying substantial form, the interference among faculties would not occur.

But Suárez's thinking displayed its strongest affinity with the Achilles Argument when he argued for the need for a *single* substantial form in a natural substance. He was arguing here against the widespread view that a single substance may contain several substantial forms. Suárez focused on the idea of more than one soul in a living substance, which had been proposed in particular for human beings.[47] Suárez maintained that no real distinction obtained between the sensitive and rational souls and that the best argument against this view was:

> seen more clearly in human beings and is derived from the subordination and dependence of all human powers and faculties. For from excessive attention to the action of one faculty, for example, to the intellective faculty, the operation of the senses is impeded, in fact even nutrition itself. And from the operation of one power, for example, from the operation of the imagination, the heart is moved, and other natural faculties are aroused. From this experience we proved above that there is a substantial form distinct from the accidental faculties in order that there may be one principle in which all the faculties are rooted and from which there proceeds that sympathy of actions.[48]

[44] 'Anima cum potentiis est unum per aggregationem' (CDA⋆, 2.3. no. 10). Suárez's view that the faculties are really distinct from the soul raises the question whether he thought they were separable from the soul. He thought that they can be separated from it by God (CDA⋆, 2.1. no. 7). He discussed this question specifically for the intellect. He did not think, however, that this separated intellect could understand, because 'a vital action intrinsically depends on the first principle of life, without which, consequently, it cannot be exercised' (CDA⋆, 2.1. no. 8).

[45] In 'The Unity of Soul in Suárez' (in *De anima acta* ed. Richard Friedman (Leiden: Brill: forthcoming)) Christopher Shields offers a thought-provoking discussion that results in a different interpretation. While in my view Suárez presented the soul itself, or its substance, as a unity in contrast with the soul taking together with its faculties, Shield argues that the soul with its faculties was a unity for Suárez.

[46] 'experimur enim rem aliquam habentem plures operandi facultates, dum intense per unam operatur, impediri ne per aliam operari possit, aut ne cum tanto conatu' (DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 15, 1: 502).

[47] DM, disp. 15, § 10, nos. 16–17, 1: 541.

[48] 'Praeterea est optima ratio communis quidem omnibus, sed quae evidentius in homine conspicitur, sumiturque ex subordinatione et dependentia omnium humanarum virium ac facultatum; nam ex attentione

So Suárez's appeal to the rootedness in one soul and its consequent direct causal activity in the operations of its powers was an appeal that relied crucially on the idea that there is a single soul in a substance as opposed to a collection of several. And Suárez thought this role constituted an argument for the unicity of the substantial form in us and other substances. Furthermore this last argument offers a specific similarity with the Achilles Argument in the following sense: on the view that there are several substantial forms in a single human being, each of these forms is responsible for a distinct set of features or capacities of the human being; for instance, the sensitive soul is the principle of sensory powers and activities and the intellectual soul for its intellectual ones. But Suárez argued that this was impossible. There must be a single soul that is the principle of both and that contributes efficient causality to both to explain their connections. Similarly the Achilles Argument contends that the soul must be a single, non-composite entity, otherwise the contents of a mental state would be distributed over its parts and consequently fail to constitute a single mental state. Both arguments then aim to establish a single entity that is non-composite in a particular sense to explain the connections between mental items.

IV: Suárez and the Achilles Argument: Similarities and differences

Of course there are some obvious differences between Suárez's reasoning and the early modern Achilles Argument. The Achilles Argument relies on unity within a mental state whereas Suárez was concerned to explain connections between mental states. The Achilles Argument aims to establish that the simple soul is the *subject* of the mental; whereas Suárez argued instead that the soul exercises efficient causality.[49] Furthermore,

nimia ad actionem unius facultatis, verbi gratia, intellectivae, impeditur operatio sensus, imo et ipsa nutritio; et ex operatione unius potentiae, verbi gratia, operatione phantasiae, movetur cor, et excitantur aliae facultates natruales. Ex qua experientia supra probavimus dari formam substantialem distinctam a facultatibus accidentalibus, ut sit unum principium, in quo omnes facultates radicentur, et a quo proveniat illa sympathia actionum' (DM, disp. 15, § 10, no. 22, 1: 542). This argument was not new with Suárez. See for instance SCG 2.58.

[49] In a different context concerns about the unity of the subject of mental state do arise in Suárez. When he addressed the question whether the intellect knows particulars (as well as universals) he argued that it must be that the intellect does know particulars. He argued against the view that in a proposition, for instance: "Peter is a man,' the subject is in the cogitative power, the predicate is in the intellect. 'But this is entirely alien to reason, for where, I ask, will be the copula? Or how will one power be able to relate the predicate to the subject unless it cognizes both?' (CDA*, 4.3. no. 3). Suárez suggested here that the unity of a proposition that is cognized requires that all its constituents are cognized by the same power. This is a stricter requirement than the one he imposed on connections between the activities that we have discussed. These are the activities of different powers but their connections can be explained in terms of the role of the soul. Furthermore I take it that Suárez's concern was with the subject of inherence: a cognition of Peter must inhere in the intellect. So here we see a line of thinking that is in important ways closer to the Achilles Argument: it is concerned with the unity in a mental state and with the subject of inherence. Suárez did not, however, use this line of thought to argue for a single soul. It would be interesting, but well beyond the scope of this chapter, to pursue the question of how this line of thought in Suárez relates to his views about the connections between the faculties.

unlike Suárez, the early modern supporters of the Achilles Argument did not think that the faculties of the soul were really distinct from it. That view seems to have disappeared with Descartes, who argued in the Sixth Meditation that the soul is indivisible, and that its powers of the soul are not parts of it, because 'it is one and the same mind [*una et eadem mens*] that wills, senses, understands.'[50] But at the same time there is an interesting similarity between Suárez and Descartes on this issue. Suárez claimed that 'the interior and exterior senses are rooted in the same soul, and thus it is the same soul [*eadem anima*] that sees through vision and imagines through imagination.'[51] While Suárez maintained the real distinction of faculties, he said that it is 'the same soul' that engages in the different activities through the faculties, a phrase very similar to Descartes' when he writes that 'it is one and the same mind that wills, senses and understands.' It is not clear to me what his claim that 'it is the same soul that sees and imagines' is supposed to mean exactly. Unlike Descartes, Suárez did not think that the soul was the subject of sensory powers, which require an informed body and inhere in matter.[52] But at the same time it is hard to resist the impression that some sort of Cartesian subject lies at the centre of Suárez's complex soul.

One interesting question is this: how close does Suárez come to actually arguing for the simplicity of the soul? This is a complicated matter. First an idea Suárez and the defender of the Achilles Argument have in common is that their arguments are meant to rule out that the items in question could be distributed over the constituents of a collective. For the Achilles Argument this is true because the unity of a mental state could not be explained. It assumes that the constituents of the state would be distributed over the parts of a composite subject, such as a body. Similarly Suárez argued that there must be a single soul that underlies the operations of its faculties, otherwise their interaction is not comprehensible. So he rules out the possibility of a plurality of souls in a living being each of which is responsible for a different set of faculties. But does Suárez's line of thought establish that this soul is simple? Could not the soul be composite in some sense and still play the unifying role he demanded of it? Consider the following example: perhaps something about the behavior of the cars on the Queen Elizabeth Way prompts us to conclude that they all got their gas at the same station. But this reasoning does not warrant the conclusion that the station is simple, or indivisible, or unified in the strong sense that is at issue.[53]

[50] CSMK 2: 59. 'Quia una & eadem mens est quae vult, quae sentit, quae intelligit' (AT, 7: 86). It is puzzling for Descartes to refer to the powers of the soul as parts of the soul, as Scholastics like Suárez, who surely are his target, instead regarded them as accidents of the soul or as accidents of the substance of which the soul is the substantial form.

[51] This is what he wrote in the early version of his *De anima*. The later version does not contain this phrase in the same context (CDA, 3.9. no. 10). For the difference between the two editions see 157n10. In this statement Suárez sounds more like Descartes than like Aquinas, who insisted that 'it is the same man who senses and understands' (ST 1a.76.a.1).

[52] CDA⋆, 2.3. no. 3.

[53] I owe the example to Allison Simmons.

This issue raises more questions than I can address adequately here. First one might ask the same question, or a related one, about the Achilles Argument. That argument assumes that if the subject of thought were composite, the parts of the thought would have to be distributed among the parts of that composite subject. But is that assumption warranted? This assumption was addressed in the correspondence between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins. Clarke offered the Achilles Argument and Collins argued that, as we would now say, thought might emerge from the qualities of the composite—he was talking about the material qualities of a body—and so might belong to a composite subject without being, as Kant was to put it, 'the concurrence of several things acting.' So the parts of the thought might not be distributed over the parts of the subject but instead belong to the composite subject as a whole by emerging from the qualities of its parts. For instance, Collins argued, the scent of a rose might emerge from the configuration of corporeal qualities of its parts but it's not the case that each particle itself has scent. The Achilles Argument simply assumes such emergence is not possible, as Collins rightly pointed out. Thus Clarke was forced to defend this assumption.[54]

So how far apart really were Suárez and the defenders of the Achilles Argument on this point? Perhaps Suárez's argument did not rule out what he surely rejected, namely the idea that a soul is a collective that acts as the single cause of the interaction between faculties. But we have now seen that the Achilles Argument has a similar limitation. On the other hand, however, there is a dialectical difference, which means that Suárez did not have any real practical need to consider this possibility. When he argued that there is one single soul or form in us (and other natural substances), the view he was addressing was precisely one on which the faculties are distributed over the different souls: the sensitive soul is the principle of sensation, the intellective soul the principle of understanding and so on.

Matters are complicated by the fact that the unicity of the soul is not the only lack of composition Suárez recognized for the human soul. Indeed it is in general true, and an important point, that a real understanding about the unity, simplicity, or indivisibility of souls (or material substances) requires the recognition that there are various types of composition that need to be considered. There are two or three significant other types in Suárez. When defending the soul's incorruptibility, for example Suárez labeled the human soul 'simple': it is spiritual and hence 'in its substance, simple.' But here he was talking about an entirely different lack of composition: the human soul is a simple subsisting form and not a composite of matter and form.[55] The human soul has neither '*partes essentiales*' nor '*partes integrales*' and so cannot decompose. And so it is this

[54] Clarke's defense takes up much of the remainder of the correspondence. For discussion of their exchange about this issue see my 'Can Matter Think? The Mind–Body Problem in the Clarke–Collins Correspondence,' in *Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Jon Miller (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 171–92.

[55] CDA★, 1.10. nos. 16 and 23–24.

hylomorphic type of non-composition that Suárez relied on to defend the soul's immortality rather than the type of unity at stake in his Achilles analogue.[56]

Furthermore Suárez offered a separate discussion of the question whether and what souls are divisible. He argued that the souls of plants and lower animals are divisible and extended,[57] matters are complicated for the higher animals, but he concluded they are indivisible.[58] But the human soul is indivisible. And finally Suárez accepted the view that the human soul is 'whole in the whole and whole in the parts' of the human body.[59] This notion was aimed at maintaining a particular type of lack of composition of the human soul in the face of its union with the body, which it informs. For that union might suggest the soul is composed of parts, each of which is present in a different part of the body. Suárez thought that this was true for lower substantial forms, a view he illustrated with the observation that when we cut a branch from a plant, it continues to live, for instance, as well as the phenomenon that when a worm is cut in two both parts continue to move. But as was typical, he rejected this view for the human soul.[60]

So the connections between the faculties established for Suárez a particular kind of lack of composition in the soul, but there were others to consider also. And given that we can find in his views different types of lack of composition, questions arise about the relationships between them.[61]

Finally a striking difference with the reasoning of the Achilles Argument is that, while that argument concerns the unity of the soul required to explain features of the mental, Suárez invoked a single soul to explain the connections within the broader category of vital faculties. He suggested explicitly that the phenomenon of interference also affected the functioning of the nutritive part of the soul.[62] It is not clear to me, however, what exactly Suárez had in mind, for he only offered specific examples of cases that we would now classify as mental. As we saw, he wrote: 'In living beings, however, *and especially in us*, we clearly experience such an effect [of the interference between faculties], for when thought is focused interiorly, it often impedes us from seeing things present to us.'[63] What

[56] For discussion, see James South, 'Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body,' in this volume, 121–36. South argues that Suárez's account of the dependence of intellect on imagination in terms of the rootedness in the soul is important for his defense of the immortality of the soul and motivated by problems raised for such a defense by Pomponazzi.

[57] CDA★, 1.13. nos. 2–3.

[58] CDA★, 1.13. no. 9.

[59] CDA★, 1.14. no. 9.

[60] CDA★, 1.13. nos. 2–3. For this issue in late Scholasticism, see Dennis Des Chene, *Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), ch. 9.

[61] For instance, since Suárez did not think that the souls of plants or lower animals are indivisible or 'whole in the whole and whole in the parts,' questions arise about how these types of unity relate to the unitary nature of the souls of all living substances that is supposed to explain the connections between the faculties of the soul.

[62] DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 15 and § 10, no. 22, 1: 502–3 and 542.

[63] DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 15, 1: 502–3.

examples of the activity of the nutritive powers did he have in mind? Did he mean to suggest that when I am in a state of religious ecstasy or philosophical absorption my digestive system goes on strike?[64]

A related problem is that he sometimes formulated this interference as involving the soul's attention, which is an idea that is difficult to apply to the nutritive faculties of the soul, or at least it is harder to see how this would work in lower animals and especially plants, which have only nutritive faculties. In sum, how do Suárez's views about the connections between the faculties we now call mental extend to the faculties of the nutritive soul?

One possible explanation is that Suárez thought that while the phenomena of interference occur (or can be observed) only in some living beings, they are evidence for the fact that the soul generally contributes directly to vital actions. And this leads us to a striking feature of Suárez's treatment of substantial forms: he takes the human soul as a paradigm. Thus when he argues that we must admit that there are substantial forms in natural things, and not just accidents, the human soul figures prominently. For instance: 'The first argument for the existence of substantial forms is that a human being consists of a substantial form as intrinsic cause; therefore all natural things do.'[65] He also contends that the great number of powers in humans requires a substantial form to 'rule, as it were, over all those faculties and accidents and to be the source of all actions and natural changes of the human being and the subject in which the whole variety of powers and accidents is rooted and unified in a certain way.'[66] We have already seen that he relied on examples from our own case about the interaction of the faculties to defend substantial forms.[67] So it is perhaps not entirely surprising that Suárez here again argued from our own case to the case of other living things or even to natural substances more generally.

Furthermore it is worth noting the following feature of his argument that there are substantial forms in natural things on the ground that the human soul is substantial. Suárez cited its ability to exist apart from the body as support for its substantiality, but he did not believe that substantial forms generally were separable in the sense that the human soul is, that is, naturally rather than solely in virtue of God's power. So in order to establish a conclusion about substantial forms generally, he relied on a feature of the human soul that he would not wish to generalize to all such forms. Yet he believed that he could draw this general conclusion because in the relevant respect human beings

[64] John Kronen writes that Suárez had in mind the idea that 'intense thought can make one insensible to hunger.' See his translation of DM disp. 15, 40n64. Perhaps it is not the sensation of hunger but being hungry that would be at stake.

[65] 'Prima igitur ratio sit, nam homo constat forma substantiali, ut intrinseca causa; ergo et res omnes naturales' (DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 6, 1: 499).

[66] 'in homine sunt illae facultates, et formae accidentales, plures fortasse ac perfectiones quam in aliis naturalibus rebus, et tamen non sufficiunt ad constitutionem alicjus naturalis entis completi, sed praeterea requiritur forma quae veluti praesit omnibus illis facultatibus et accidentibus, et sit fons omnium actionum, et naturalium motuum talis entis, et in qua tota illa varietas accidentium et potentiarum radicem et quamdam unitatem habeat' (DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 7, 1: 499).

[67] DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 15, 1: 502–3.

and other natural things are 'of the same order.'[68] Similarly perhaps he thought that interference among vital faculties that occurs in human beings establishes a direct role of a unitary soul in general, including in lower animals and plants, while not thinking necessarily that the specific types of phenomena in question actually occur in all living things.

Finally from a historical point of view Suárez's taking the human soul as paradigm for substantial forms is very striking.[69] As is well-known, when one starts with the original notion of substantial form in Aristotle, the human soul as understood by Suárez and other medievals is a questionable instance of such a form and it puts significant pressure on the traditional notion of substantial form. The Scholastic notion of a substantial form includes the forms of animals, plants, mixed bodies, and elements and it is the notion of something that is intrinsically a constituent of a substance and cannot exist outside of a substance. But the human soul is supposed to be a substantial form while at the same time having a nature that allows it to exist separately from the body. Aquinas, for instance, clearly saw this tension and worked hard to alleviate the pressure.[70]

Among the early moderns, on the other hand, the human soul was frequently the model of the substantial form. Descartes sometimes claimed that the human soul was the only substantial form.[71] A different and more complicated example is Leibniz, who repeatedly offered the human soul as the model for his notion of substantial form.[72] Thus the human soul traveled from being a marginal instance of a substantial form to being its paradigm.[73] Given that Suárez presented the human soul as a paradigm substantial form, the modern approach had a precursor in Suárez and it is suggestive of his views as exemplifying a transition from Aristotelian Scholastic conceptions of souls to early modern ones.

V: Conclusion

In thinking that the powers of the soul are really distinct from it and from each other, Suárez attributes a kind of complexity to the soul that was common in Scholasticism

[68] 'ejusdem ordinis' (DM, disp. 15, § 1, no. 7, 1: 499).

[69] For discussion of Suárez's focus on the human soul in his treatment of substantial forms, see Helen Hattab, *Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), ch. 3.

[70] ST, 1.76.1 and SCG 2.68.

[71] See his letter to Regius, January 1642, AT, 3: 503 and 505; CSMK, 3: 207–8.

[72] Letter to Arnauld, 28 November/8 December 1686 (G, 2:76), where he spoke of 'a soul or substantial form on the model of what is called me [*moi*]'. For a translation, see *G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays*, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 79.

[73] It is worth noting the demand by the Fifth Lateran Council that required acceptance of the view that the human soul is a substantial form. This demand was not in the first place motivated by a strong commitment to hylomorphism, but by opposition to Averroism: the Council aimed to save the view that human beings have an individual, immortal soul. But that feature of the soul, which requires its separability from matter, precisely strained against the original conception of substantial forms. See *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, 482f., art. 1440f and 390, art. 901. For discussion, see Étienne Gilson, 'Autour de Pomponazzi: Problématique de l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie au début du XVIième siècle', in *Humanisme et Renaissance* (Paris: Vrin, 1983).

but which seems to stand in marked contrast with the view widespread in the early modern period (and not nearly new with that period) that the soul is simple or indivisible. Significant problems arise from this ontological complexity in combination with Suárez's view that the powers can't interact, problems which we would now mostly classify as problems for the unity of consciousness. But Suárez was keenly aware of these problems and he offered solutions to them by arguing for a strong role of a single soul in the activities of its powers. And he uses this role to argue further that this soul must be a single entity, a single substantial form. I have argued that at the heart of this line of thinking there are some important ideas that have real affinity with the Achilles Argument. Stepping back from the details, it is striking to see that while, in marked contrast with the Achilles Argument, Suárez accepted the ontological complexity of the soul with its faculties, at the same time, like the proponents of the Achilles Argument, he saw a need for a single, unitary soul to explain the activities we now call properly mental, or even in his view, of living things more generally.

Suárez's conception of the soul was marked by several tensions: he regarded the soul as the principle of life generally, but focused his discussion of it on mental phenomena. He regarded souls as substantial forms, but focused on the atypical human soul. He thought the soul plus its faculties was one by aggregation, but saw a need for a single, unitary soul underlying the activities of these faculties. Buried, as it were, in Suárez's complex Aristotelian Scholastic soul there is single, unitary entity, whose involvement in its activities relies on attention, suggestive of the Cartesian unitary conscious subject, an entity that is 'the same soul' that senses, imagines, and understands.

I have argued for a similarity between Suárez's line of thought and the early modern Achilles Argument. But there are also important differences. I have not aimed to establish any particular historical connections with early modern uses of the Achilles Argument. I have no views about such connections, and the early moderns had far too wide a range of philosophical views accessible to them for me to consider any claims of such kind. It is my sense that a deeper understanding of the issues regarding the unity of the soul in the early modern period would benefit from a deeper understanding of the metaphysical issues at play in Suárez's analysis of the soul. I hope to have contributed to such understanding and that I have provided inspiration for further investigation into the depths of Suárez's soul.[74]

[74] This chapter has benefited from discussion with Kara Richardson, and especially with Martin Pickavé, who wrote extensive comments on two drafts. Alison Simmons gave very stimulating, helpful comments on the paper at its presentation at the workshop on Suárez at the University of Western Ontario in September 2008.