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The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (review)

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done *and* [my italics] *a* is derivable by reason alone as conducive to self-preservation" (73). Each of these conditions is necessary but neither by itself is sufficient for an action to be moral, according to Martinich's version of Hobbes's theory.

Perhaps the book's most striking thesis is Martinich's assertion that *Leviathan* should be regarded as a "Bible for modern man" (45). In developing this thesis, he goes beyond simply interpreting Hobbes's intentions and instead defends the rationality of the Hobbesian project, understood as an attempt to synthesize Calvinist beliefs with a materialist modern science. The ambitious scope of such a synthesis is evident in the equally detailed treatment Martinich offers, both when discussing better-known topics like self-interest and the state of nature and when elucidating the lesser-known doctrines concerning everything from angels to eschatology in Parts III and IV of *Leviathan*.

How effective is this study in realizing the goals it sets for itself? As an interpretation of Hobbes's views on religion, politics, and—to a lesser extent—science, it makes a plausible proposal for how to integrate these views into a single system. If Hobbes's writings were intended by him to constitute a fully coherent whole, then readers will find Martinich's interpretive suggestions to be very instructive. If, however, the relevant Hobbesian texts can be shown to fall short of full coherence, then his interpretation will be less helpful. Of course Martinich himself does not shy away from pointing out contradictions in a number of Hobbesian positions, including the account of the sovereign-making covenant. But what seems missing in this book is an explanation of how Hobbes's more notable inconsistencies ought to be reconciled with the claim that he intended to articulate a single, coherent Christian materialist worldview. Could it have been the case that such a worldview was impossible coherently to define? Certainly Hobbes, in defending the truth of his assertions, valued most highly the internal consistency of his version of this worldview. Is it possible that Hobbes's version is not coherent enough to be defended? What would its possible failure tell us about the advisability in general of defending Christian materialism? Perhaps, in a future work, Martinich will develop the interesting project he has begun here by addressing these unanswered questions.

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John Cottingham, editor. *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 441. Cloth, \$49.95. Paper, \$17.95.

John Cottingham's *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes* aims to be a collection of essays that makes Descartes accessible to students and nonspecialists and that can serve as a reference work. The collection is quite successful in reaching this goal. The essays are generally very readable and cover a wide array of issues in Descartes's writings. In addition, the type of scholarship manifested in these papers varies widely. They range from papers that focus with great intensity on philosophical details of issues in Des-

cartes's writings to ones that are devoted to matters of historical context. In addition, the essays have a good deal to offer for specialists.

Recent trends in Descartes scholarship are represented by contributions that aim to place his writings in historical context. The volume does so more than any other collection of essays on Descartes in English, and this is one of its strengths. It begins with a biographical essay by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis that is very rich in detail. Her repeated criticisms of the seventeenth-century biography of Descartes by Adrien Baillet bring out the difficulties of Descartes biography. Roger Ariew contributes a fascinating essay on the subtleties of Descartes's relations with the scholastics. The book closes with a very informative discussion of the reception of Descartes's thought by Nicholas Jolley. Several of the other contributions analyze Descartes's ideas while relating them to those of his contemporaries and predecessors. Examples are the essays by Garber, Hatfield, Clarke, and, to some extent, Cottingham.

Some of the papers in the volume concern issues that have generally been of interest to readers of Descartes in recent decades, especially in the English-speaking world. This is the case for Peter Markie's essay on the *cogito*, Louis Loeb's paper on the Cartesian circle, and Cottingham's paper on Descartes's dualism. Markie and Loeb succeed in exposing the reader to a number of important questions concerning the topics at issue. Cottingham makes a valuable contribution by illuminating the theological, metaphysical, and scientific aspects of Descartes's dualism.

Other papers concern topics that have (rightly or wrongly) been of interest primarily to Descartes scholars. One example is Jean-Luc Marion's paper on the simple natures, which, among other things, connects the early, rather neglected *Rules* to later works. Another example is Jean-Marie Beyssade's subtle paper on the idea of God.

In addition, the volume contains several papers about Descartes's science and his conception of body—issues that until recently were wrongly neglected by philosophers. Examples are Garber's rich contribution on Descartes's physics, which contains a substantial amount of material from his recent book *Descartes's Metaphysical Physics*, Desmond Clarke's discussion of the philosophy of science, Gary Hatfield's treatment of Descartes's physiology, and Amélie Rorty's adventurous foray into Descartes's view of the role of the body in thought. Stephen Gaukroger contributes a discussion of philosophical aspects of Descartes's algebra. These papers form a very welcome component of the volume. Interest in Descartes among contemporary philosophers has mainly focused on his conception of the mind and epistemology. Descartes's views about these issues are extremely important and interesting. But he probably actually spent more time thinking about the nature of the physical world.

The volume succeeds, furthermore, in illuminating the uninitiated because in several respects it leaves the reader with a more sophisticated picture of Descartes than is common. For instance, Clarke's essay blocks the usual ascription to Descartes of excessive and simpleminded faith in the possibility of *a priori* knowledge in natural science. The attention to his relations with contemporaries and the reception of his thought makes vivid the fact that, although in the late twentieth century he is often (although not always) regarded as a surpassed philosopher, at the time he was perceived as a revolutionary.

One regret that I wish to voice is that the volume could have had more depth in relation to Descartes's conception of the mind. For instance, although Cartesian dualism is notoriously unpopular in contemporary philosophy, Descartes's main argument for it continues to attract a lot of attention. Scholarship about this argument is often very sophisticated philosophically.¹ Cottingham briefly mentions this interest in his introduction, but the uninformed reader is likely to come away without realizing the philosophical interest of the argument.

As is certainly a virtue in a volume that aims to function as a reference work on Descartes, the collection has a good bibliography, and the essays usually contain extensive, useful references to secondary literature and other sources in footnotes. On a few occasions one would wish for more. Thus Clarke relates Descartes's views about science to Aristotelian scholasticism, but without references to scholastic sources, or to secondary sources that might contain such references. Markie discusses objections to aspects of the *cogito* without mentioning that these objections were voiced centuries ago by Hume and Kant.

Given the breadth of its offerings, and its readability, this volume should, indeed, prove to be a very useful companion to Descartes.

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Peter A. Schouls. *Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. Pp. x + 243. Cloth, \$37.50. Paper, \$13.95.

Schouls sees Descartes as the greatest of the "forefathers" of the Enlightenment and Locke as second only to him. At "the core of Enlightenment thinking" are the concepts of freedom, progress and self-mastery, all closely tied to concepts of reason and education. Locke influenced the Enlightenment through his views about reason, freedom, and a master passion for self-mastery as these are expounded in the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* and inform both his theory of education and his strong belief in progress (1-3).

Locke thinks that we each have a duty to achieve total epistemic and moral autonomy (4, 8, 33, 45, 139). We are never to accept any proposition unless we see its grounds for ourselves. We are never to act on any desire until it has been approved by our own reason. Locke is a revolutionary thinker because he imposes these methodological requirements, and his revolutionary politics follows from them (16, 20, 22). We can satisfy the requirements because we possess infallible reason and a will that

¹Just a few examples are Margaret Wilson, *Descartes* (Routledge and Kegan Paul: New York, 1978), 185-200; Stephen Schiffer, "Descartes on His Essence," *Philosophical Review* 85 (1976): 21-43; James Van Cleve, "Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 64 (1983): 35-45. For my own view of the argument see my "Descartes's Case for Dualism," forthcoming in this journal. I place Descartes's dualism in historical context in "The Role of the Intellect in Descartes's Case for the Incorporeity of the Mind," in *Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes*, ed. Stephen Voss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 97-114.